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Resolving Land Disputes in East Asia: Exploring the Limits of Law  
John Gillespie and Hualing Fu 
[John Gillespie (with Hualing Fu eds.,) Chapter One, Resolving Land Disputes in East 
Asia: Exploring the Limits of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014] 
Introduction 
Land disputes are increasing in East Asia as economic and demographic growth 
intensifies the demand for farmland and urban spaces. Nowhere is this more evident than 
in China and Vietnam. Reforms that brought Socialist Asia into the globalized economy 
and returned private property have also sparked intense competition between farmers and 
residents with outsiders, such as private developers and government agencies. In China 
and Vietnam, industrial parks, transport infrastructure and new residential developments 
are encroaching on farmland, sparking increasingly violent clashes with farmers. China 
alone experienced more than 500 daily land disputes and protests in 2011,
1
 with the 
Wukan village insurrection, discussed in Chapter 6 in this book, making newspaper 
headlines around the world. 
From a legal perspective, the proliferation of land disputes is puzzling, because it is 
occurring at the same time as governments in China and Vietnam are clarifying property 
rights and improving formal dispute resolution institutions, such as the courts. Rather 
than promoting uniformity, order, and predictability, the authors in this book reveal that 
law reforms have produced mixed results. Land claims and property rights often conflict, 
                                                 
1
 See Max Fisher, “How China Stays Stable Despite 500 Protests Every Day,” The Atlantic, January 5, 
2012, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/how-china-stays-stable-
despite-500-protests-every-day/250940/. 
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producing unpredictable and multi-layered dispute resolution processes. Highly 
ambiguous and contested patterns of land access persist in these countries. Consequently, 
courts and administrative agencies such as grand mediation struggle to use property rights 
to find lasting solutions to land disputes. Far from state legal processes dominating, no 
single actor or set of regulatory traditions can gain the upper hand in many land cases.  
Taiwan and Hong Kong have been added to this study because they furnish valuable 
comparative insights into how closely related, but significantly wealthier, societies, have 
enlisted the law to resolve land disputes. These regions are connected to China and 
Vietnam through shared neo-Confucian values, and perhaps more significantly, a 
common pre-colonial system of land regulation (discussed in Chapters 3, 10, 12, and 14). 
This system, which was perfected during the Tang Dynasty in China, linked central 
imperial governance with village control over land. As Chapters 8 and 11 reveal, echoes 
of this system are found in the customary land systems found in rural China and Vietnam, 
and more surprisingly, in highly developed urban spaces in Taipei and Hong Kong 
(Chapters 13 and 15 ). These findings connect with other socio-legal studies about 
advanced industrial countries that show how state land systems are interwoven with 
informal land systems.
2
  
Authors apply different disciplinary approaches to understand how state agencies and 
communities imaginatively interact to conceptualize and resolve land disputes. They 
explore if legislative, judicial, and administrative reforms are capable of resolving land 
disputes or if more fundamental reforms are required? This approach contrasts with 
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 For a discussion about regulatory land communities, see Robert C. Ellickson, “Unpacking the Household: 
Informal Property Rights around the Hearth” (2006) 116 Yale Law Journal 226 at 271–276; Amnon 
Lehavi, “How Property Can Create, Maintain or Destroy Community” (2008) 10(1) Theoretical Inquiries 
into Law 43 at 52–65. 
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studies that focus exclusively on either the role of property rights and state institutions or 
on local communities. Authors search for solutions to land disputes in the dynamic 
interaction between the relevant actors.  
Mapping the causes of land disputes in East Asia 
Land disputes and the political economy  
Much has been written from a political economy perspective about the origins and nature 
of land disputes in Socialist Asia.
3
 Although this literature differs in detail, there is a 
broad consensus about the demographic and economic forces underlying land conflicts in 
this region. Population
4
 and industrial growth have produced historically unprecedented 
levels of urbanization, necessitating the continuous conversion of rural land for urban 
development. 
At the time of its founding six decades ago, urbanization in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) was little more than 10 percent. By 2011, for the first time in Chinese 
history, more people lived in urban than rural areas.
5
 In the 30 years since economic 
reforms began, urbanization has grown from 15 percent to 50 percent, adding an 
additional 500 million urban dwellers.
6
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 See, generally, Y. T. Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); George Lin, Developing China: Land, Politics and Social 
Conditions (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Peter Ho, Institutions in transition: Land 
ownership, property rights and social conflict in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
4
 At 0.47 percent per annum, the population growth in China is considerably slower than the 1.04 percent in 
Vietnam. See United Nations Sources, available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/vietnam/population-
growth-annual-percent-wb-data.html. 
5 See Bloomberg News, “China’s Urban Population Exceeds Countryside for First Time,” January 17, 
2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-17/china-urban-population-exceeds-
rural.html. 
6
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at http://esa.un.org/unup/ (last accessed February 28, 2013). 
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The scale of urbanization in China is unprecedented. For example, at the height of US 
urban renewal projects during the New Deal period in the 1930s, Pittsburgh’s Golden 
Triangle and Lower Hill redevelopments displaced 28,000 residents. The number of 
displaced people due to construction projects in the PRC is estimated to have reached a 
staggering 50 million, including 17 million due to the construction of dams.
7
 In 2003 
alone, 180,000 Beijing residents were resettled. “This is human upheaval on a scale seen 
previously only in time of war or extreme natural catastrophe.”8 Government policies in 
China are set to shift a further 250 million farmers to cities by 2025.
9
 
Vietnam exhibits a similar, although proportionally, smaller urbanization trajectory. In 
the last 20 years, the urban population has risen from 15 to 30 percent, and it is expected 
to reach 45 percent in the next 20 years.
10
 Reflecting higher levels of wealth and 
economic development, the urbanization rate in Taiwan is 75 percent.
11
 As a city state, 
Hong Kong has for more than a century maintained high urbanization levels.
12
 
The patterns of land disputes between China and Vietnam share similarities and 
significant differences. In both countries, farmers fight with each other for scarce 
farmland. Despite the process of urbanization in both countries, land disputes in rural 
areas among farmers remain a serious issue, although the patterns of dispute may 
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 Huang Dongdong, Development, Resettlement and Governance (Beijing: Law Press, forthcoming, 2014). 
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fluctuate according to the employment of the migrants in the cities. China and Vietnam 
are also experiencing large-scale conversion of rural land to urban and industrial use—
leading to clashes between farmers and developers. To gauge the scale of land 
acquisition, between 1995 and 2005, Chinese cities increased in land area by 59 
percent.
13
 In Vietnam, the area of farmland taken over in the last decade reached 1 
million hectares, greater than the 810,000 hectares redistributed during the socialist land 
reforms in the 1950s.
14
  
And there are significant differences between China and Vietnam. As Xin He discusses in 
Chapter 7 in this book, urban renewal projects have become a major source of land 
disputes in China. Vietnam has not yet accumulated the wealth needed to replace poor 
quality housing stock on a significant scale. But, in both countries, increasing numbers of 
land-taking disputes in peri-urban and rural areas are being experienced. Faced with high 
urban densities, housing and industrial developers have little option but to expand into 
farmland.  
In what Annette Kim
15
 termed fiscal socialism, local governments in China and Vietnam 
used their urban planning controls to compel private developers to provide public 
services and amenities that could not be financed from government budgets. Local 
governments used their extensive powers over land allocation to recruit private 
developers to realize state planning schemes. The large increases in land value generated 
                                                 
13
 See George Lin, Developing China: Land, Politics and Social Conditions (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2009), p. 180. 
14
 See Vu Tuan Anh, “Land Issues in the Process of Implementing the 1992 Constitution” (2012) 216 
Vietnam Economic Review 16–27. 
15
 Annette Kim, “A Market Without the ‘Right’ Property Rights: Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam’s Newly-
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by fiscal socialism were sufficient to pay for roads, pavements, utilities, and even 
schools. Fiscal socialism could only function, however, if farmers were paid low rates of 
compensation for their land.  
As authors have observed, it is the unequal sharing of rapid economic growth and, in 
particular, the increasing economic divide between rural and urban populations that have 
animated many land disputes in Socialist Asia. Many of the land-takings have taken place 
in the peri-urban and urban fringe areas where the interface between wealthy urban and 
poorer rural communities is most evident. Tensions are further exacerbated when rural 
communities see their land taken for private developments, such as golf courses and 
luxury apartments, rather than for public purposes that might benefit the public and the 
nation.   
As Jie Cheng observes in Chapter 4, tax raised by local governments from land sales 
increased exponentially after 1994 when a tax-sharing system began, further propelling 
demand for farmland. She cites a report prepared by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Science in 2010, showing that the percentage of tax revenue from land sales increased 
from 3 percent in 1998 to 11 percent by 2008. This amount further increased by an 
astonishing 63 percent in 2009. The report concluded that pressure to increase tax income 
is a potent force driving land-takings in China. With tax revenues in decline and 
expenditure on the rise, local governments face the hard choice of making more land 
sales or falling into deep debt.  
Land disputes and social cleavages 
Land disputes are not only attributable to economic and demographic factors, but also 
they are anchored in historical contests that reflect longstanding beliefs and practises. As 
7 
 
authors in this book observe, many conflicts occur at the intersection of major social 
cleavages, such as claims by a resurgent Catholic Church for the return of land seized by 
the revolutionary government in Vietnam, and claims by farmers for their spiritual 
connection to village altars and cemeteries. Land disputes are also influenced by less 
visible, but nonetheless potent, everyday acts of resistance to state power. As Mark 
Seldon and Elizabeth Perry observed in relation to China:  
These take such forms as private acts of evasion, flight and foot dragging, which, 
in the absence of manifestos or marches, may nevertheless effectively enlarge the 
terrain of social rights.
16
 
Authors in this book add the additional insights that legal challenges through 
administrative petitions and court litigation pressure state officials to justify their actions, 
and in the process, open new ways of conceptualizing and asserting private and 
community property claims. Authors also describe how social media not only mobilizes 
public opinion, but also is a key source of inspiration and instruction for land claimants 
and is reshaping the interaction between land users and state regulators.  
Growing numbers of land disputes 
Statistics concerning land disputes in China and Vietnam are fragmented, making the 
precise identification of trends problematic. There is, nevertheless, a broad consensus that 
the number and complexity of land disputes in China and Vietnam is growing. Details are 
provided in the chapters introducing China (Chapter 3) and Vietnam (Chapter 10). To set 
the scene, a longitudinal survey conducted by Landesa in China shows that the number of 
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land-taking cases has increased every year since 2001 when the study began.
17
 The 
survey also found that, in 2011, farmers were, on average, offered compensation rates of 
USD$17,850 per acre, about 10 percent of the USD$740,000 per acre that state 
authorities received for the land. It is unsurprising that the dissatisfaction rates among 
farmers eclipsed the satisfaction rates by a margin of two to one. 
18
 This discontent has 
translated into numerous, sometimes violent land disputes in China.
19
  
According to statistics prepared by the Government Inspectorate in Vietnam, there were 
700,000 land complaints from 2009 to 2012, and more than 70 percent concerned 
compulsory land acquisition.
20
  
Conceptualizing land disputes 
This book explores the idea that land disputes are socially constructed. The way in which 
land disputes are conceptualized profoundly influences not only what is considered a 
dispute, but also the appropriateness of dispute resolution forums and outcomes. In their 
seminal article “The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming and 
Claiming,” William Felstiner, Richard Able, and Austin Sarat observed that, in 
attributing blame, actors shape the trajectory of disputes.
21
 For example, if actors believe 
they are partially to blame, then they are unlikely to escalate grievances into claims or 
disputes. Felstiner, Able, and Sarat concluded that disputes are rarely ordered by 
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 See Landesa, “Summary of 2011 17-Province Survey Findings: Insecure Land Rights the Single Greatest 
Challenge Facing China’s Sustainable Development,” April 26, 2012, Research Report Landesa, p. 2. 
18
 Ibid. 
19 
See Fisher, “How China Stays Stable Despite 500 Protests Every Day.” 
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 See VNS, “Red Tape Leads to Property Disputes,” Viet Nam News, September 19, 2012, available at 
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uncontested sets of norms and practises; but rather they are socially constructed from 
different conceptual frameworks. 
Taking this idea further, scholars in a wide range of fields, such as socio-legal studies,
22
 
sociology,
23
 and economics,
24
 argue that the tacit assumptions and norms embedded 
within people shape the conceptual frameworks they find compelling. According to 
Felstiner, Able, and Sarat, it is these frameworks that actors turn to when attributing 
blame in disputes. A core question considered in this book is whether land disputes are 
more easily resolved when the main actors, both state and non-state, share conceptually 
compatible frameworks and generally agree about the cause of the dispute and the 
appropriate outcomes. Conversely, do negotiations break down and disputes become 
intractable when actors lack compatible frameworks for determining blame and redress?  
Particularly in rapidly transforming societies,
25
 such as socialist-transforming Asia,
 
diverse educational, economic, and social experiences generate differences in the 
distribution of knowledge. This fragmentation of knowledge produces a diversity of 
conceptual frameworks. As the case studies in this book demonstrate, the most intractable 
land disputes seem to occur at knowledge boundaries found, for example, at the peri-
urban interface between globally connected cities and farming communities.  
                                                 
22
 See generally Susan Silbey, “After Legal Consciousness” (2005) 1 Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science 323–368; Lawrence Lessig, “The Regulation of Social Meaning” (1995) 62(3) University of 
Chicago Law Review 958–961. 
23
 See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 
1966), p. 65.  
24
 See Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
25
 See Jerrold Long, “Private Lands, Conflict and Institutional Evolution in the Post-Public Lands” (2011) 
28(3) Pace West Environmental Law Review 670–789. 
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Drawing on the authors’ studies, it is possible to identify three main frameworks used to 
conceptualize land disputes in Socialist Asia. In practise, the actors involved in disputes 
rarely rely on just one framework and often interweave ideas from one framework into 
another. Before discussing the ramifications of this blurring and hybridization, we discuss 
the three main conceptual frameworks below.  
Seeing like a state 
James Scott argues that the process of simplification, codification, and standardization—
much of what land laws, cadastral plans, and land titles do—is an essential aspect of 
governing modern states.
26
 Because societies more often than not comprise “a reality so 
complex and variegated as to defy easy short-hand description,” states must first 
transform societies into “neat constructs of science” before they can govern.27 This 
regulatory technology enables states to govern without fine-grained knowledge about 
everyday practices—to govern at a distance on a large scale. To recreate the modernist 
ideal of orderly planned cities and industrial agriculture, governments throughout East 
Asia imported European planning schemes and land titling systems.
28
  
A central aspect of modernist land management is governance through codification and 
abstraction. This transformation assumes a shift from particularism to universalism and 
from substantive to procedural justice. Authors in this book query if this transformation 
                                                 
26
 See James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 11–22. 
27
 See Scott, Seeing Like a State, pp. 11–22. 
28
 See generally Anan Ganjanapan, “The northern Thai land tenure system: local customs versus national 
laws (Ching Mai province)” (1994) 28(3) Law and Society Review 609–622; Franz von Benda-Beckmann 
and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, “Property, politics, and conflict: Ambon and Minangkabau compared” 
(1994) 28(3) Law and Society Review 589–607. 
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uniformly applies to China and Vietnam (see Chapters 8 9, and 11).
29
 Although they 
point to increased codification, the case studies also show the ongoing importance of 
interpersonal relationships, the treatment of each land dispute as sui generis, and as a 
consequence, the lack of general principles that apply predictably and systematically to 
every case. In Chapter 4, Jie Cheng makes the additional point that litigants are most 
likely to win land cases by challenging the exercise of official powers rather than 
questioning procedural defects. All of this suggests that “seeing like a state” takes on a 
different form in socialist East Asia than in western Europe. 
Scott also notes that officials are not content with merely promoting state governance; in 
“seeing like a state,” they displaced rival modes of regulation. For example, officials use 
laws to define boundaries of control and discredit or omit practises that were considered 
inconvenient or resistant to control. Nowhere was this approach more obvious than in the 
Soviet land planning introduced into China and Vietnam during the 1960s.
30
 
Revolutionary governments in Europe and Asia sought to sweep away backward 
traditional cultures that had become associated with class oppression and feudalism. 
Marx followed a well-established European intellectual tradition that depicted Asian 
societies in undifferentiated ways as “semi-barbarians,” portrayals that generated socialist 
antipathy, or at least indifference, to neo-Confucian and “feudal” culture.31 To varying 
degrees, governments in China and Vietnam believed that a universal “proletarian 
                                                 
29 
See also William Hurst, Mingxing Liu, Yongdong Liu, and Ran Tao, “Reassessing Collective Petitioning 
in Rural China: Civic Engagement, Extra-State Violence, and Regional Variation” (2010) APSA 2009 
Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009, revised 2013, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1448983.. 
30
 See Yehua Dennis Wei, “Planning Chinese Cities: The Limits of Transitional Institutions” (2005) 26(3) 
Urban Geography 201–221. 
31
 Karl Marx, “Otechestvenniye Zapiski,” (1887), reproduced in Shlomo Avineri, “Introduction,” in 
Shlomo Avineri (ed.), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (New York: Doubleday, 1969), p. 6.  
12 
 
culture” would link the working classes in different countries, and “Asiatic” and “feudal” 
modes of production would dissolve in the face of this unifying force.
32
 
Soviet planning drew directly from the same intellectual traditions as the “city beautiful” 
movement that shaped land governance in Europe and North America.
33
 Soviet land 
planners enjoyed close links with French urbanisme, which emphasized large-scale urban 
redevelopment and long-lasting streetscapes. What the Soviets found attractive about 
Baron Haussman was his penchant for re-engineering the physical landscape to change 
social behavior. When integrated into Soviet central planning, this utopian planning 
became even more rigid than in Europe. Soviet planners insisted that economic and social 
planning could only be understood in Marxist-Leninist terms, which defined out-of-
existence private markets and other modes of self-regulation. Following Soviet practises, 
land planning in China and Vietnam took place at stratospheric levels of abstraction that 
dismissed customary land regulation as unbounded, inefficient, and potentially 
subversive.
34
 
In both China and Vietnam, the technology of land governance declined after the 
revolution. As Phung Minh, a French-trained land surveyor, recalled in his memoirs, 
skills and technical competencies eroded during the high-socialist period (1954–1986) 
when professional cadastral mapping effectively ceased in Hanoi. He depicted housing 
and land management during this period as arbitrary and haphazard.
35
 And he thought 
                                                 
32
 See, for example, Truong Chinh, “Marxism and Vietnamese Culture” report delivered to the Second 
National Cultural Conference, July 1948, reproduced in Truong Chinh Selected Writings (Hanoi: The Gioi 
Publishers, 1994), pp. 251–252.  
33
 See Scott, Seeing Like a State, Chapter 4; William Logan, “The Russians on the Red River: The Soviet 
Impact on Hanoi’s Town Scape 1955–1990” (1995) 47(3) Europe-Asia Studies 443–468. 
34
 See Wei, “Planning Chinese Cities: The Limits of Transitional Institutions.” 
35
 See Phung Minh, 40 Nam Quan Ly Nha Cua O Ha Noi (40 Years of Housing Management in Hanoi) , 
unpublished paper, Hanoi, October 16–17, 1998. 
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that the culture of revolutionary resistance did not generate respect for rule-based land 
management, because revolutionaries sought to subvert state power structures. 
Reinforcing this antipathy toward the technology of regulation, many senior cadres who 
migrated to Hanoi from rural areas after 1954 were unfamiliar with, even contemptuous 
of, the title by registration system operating in former colonial centers.  
Following economic reforms in the 1970 and 1980, governments in China and Vietnam 
once again turned their attention to the technology of land governance (see Chapters 3 
and 10). They upgraded cadastral planning and land-titling technologies to render land 
holdings intelligible and secure. Although the governments in these countries now 
tolerate private markets and other modes of self-regulation, they continue to insist on 
state land management. Reforms have ensured that state officials will continue to manage 
the property rights regime and private property markets. 
There is another distinctly modernizing feature of land law and planning. As Michael 
Lief
36
 observed in relation to peri-urban China and Vietnam:  
[t]he expansion of urban administrative structures into formerly rural settings is 
understood to be an effort not only to regulate urbanization, to bring villagers’ 
spontaneous activities in line with the laws of the state, but to rein in their frontier 
lawlessness more broadly, to “civilize” the countryside.  
In short, state regulation aims to displace the “local personalism of traditional village 
practices,” which must be wiped away before villagers can join modern society.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
36
 See Michael Lief, “Peri-Urban Asia: A Commentary on Becoming Urban” (2011) 84(3) Pacific Affairs  
531. 
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This “seeing like a state” mindset has influenced the way policy-makers and land 
officials conceptualize land disputes. Authors (see Chapter 4) in this book show that 
officials blame land disputes on unclear laws and incomplete procedures. If formal legal 
structures are not at fault, then officials attribute failings to administrative shortcomings 
or outright corruption. Officials also blame the public for lacking “legal consciousness” 
and circumventing land laws and procedures. Underlying this diagnosis is the assumption 
that states are the optimal regulators, and that state laws and regulatory technologies 
should displace informal land practices.  
The case studies about Taiwan and Hong Kong provide a glimpse into what can happen 
when societies judicialize and democratize. In both countries, governments “see like 
states” in planning land and housing developments, but their instrumental powers are 
checked by courts and more recently by democratic processes. In Hong Kong, courts 
from the early days of the colony played a prominent role in resolving land disputes by 
balancing competing property rights (see Chapter 14). More recently, democratic reforms 
in both countries have encouraged public participation in every stage of the land-planning 
process and enabled civil protests to pressure officials into recognizing customary land 
entitlements and preventing developers from compromising land rights. 
Economic development and property rights 
Recycling property rights 
15 
 
Belief in the capacity of property rights to promote economic development and social 
stability in East Asia is not new. In 1880, the French Colonial Inspector of Native Affairs 
in Vietnam opined that:
37
  
The establishment of property ownership will be the prosperity of the country: the 
rights to sell, to buy, to mortgage – to execute all the conveyances of property will 
augment the country’s wealth in circulating the capital which is now frozen by 
many cultivators.  
Similar arguments were made to support the introduction of property rights in the PRC 
and by the British in Hong Kong.  
Far from unlocking the wealth of indigenous cultivators, property rights during the period 
of colonial domination secured wealth for foreign investors and local elites.
38
 The 
accumulation of estates made possible by land titling dispossessed large numbers of 
farmers, resulting in subsistence incomes as tenants and wage laborers.
39
 The inequities 
generated by the private enclosure of land excited social unrest throughout the colonial 
period and is considered by many historians as the single most important catalyst for 
socialist revolution in China and Vietnam.
40
  
Revolutionary land policies in these countries could hardly have differed more from 
colonial property rights. A core objective of Marxist-Leninism was to replace private 
                                                 
37
 Jean Louis Bassford, Land development policy in Cochin China under the French (1865–1925) (Ann 
Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1984), pp. 129–130. 
38
 See Chapter 12 An Overview of Taiwanese Land Law and Dispute Resolution in this book; Martin 
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40
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property rights with state and collective ownership. The Chinese Constitution of 1954 
followed this line by providing for people’s ownership of land (see Chapter 3). In order to 
appease the capitalist South, both the 1946 and 1960 Constitutions in the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam retained private land ownership. Following victory over the South 
in 1975, the post-reunification 1980 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
adopted the Soviet formulation of people’s ownership and state management of land.41  
Karl Marx, and Frederick and Engels dismissed legally protected property rights in the 
West as bourgeois instruments “for the mutual guarantee of their property and 
interests.”42 To displace “bourgeois” property rights, Soviet theorists conceptualized land 
as a “special commodity” or public good. In contrast to “bourgeois” property, land in 
Soviet theory was not a tradable commodity and could not be used for private exchange 
and personal advantage.
43
 Party elites in both China and Vietnam followed this Marxist-
Leninist trope until market reforms in the 1970s and 1980s unleashed housing and land 
markets (see Chapters 3 and 10).  
Early post-Mao reforms in China (1978–1982) and doi moi (renovation) reforms in 
Vietnam (1979–1986) focused on agricultural decollectivization and market opening. In 
both countries, individual household contracts gave farmers control over the 
management, output, and marketing of agricultural production in exchange for payments 
in the form of crops and labor to the village, and taxes to the state. This household 
                                                 
41
 1980 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, art. 20. 
42
 Karl Marx and Frederick Engles, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers (R. Pascal 
ed., 1960 [1846]), p. 59. 
43
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responsibility system effectively ended decades of state collectivization in favor of 
private agricultural production.  
Responding to pressure from below, in 1993, the Chinese state extended the term of 
household contracts from 15 to 30 years, and in 1998 for an additional period of 30 years. 
Throughout this period, land use rights in agricultural land remained with the village 
authorities, giving them significant management powers over land use and disposal. The 
Rural Land Contracting Law 2002 continued this policy by conferring land use rights on 
households, rather than on individuals. The Law’s primary purpose is to prevent large-
scale arbitrary reallocations of land and to allow transfers of land between households. 
Generally, farmers have two land use rights over rural land. The first is the right to 
contract out the land for agricultural production, and the second is the right to use land to 
construct a residential homestead. Attempts to individualize rights over agricultural land 
in the Land Law 2007 were blocked, ensuring the retention of strong state management 
powers over rural land rights. A recent survey conducted by Landesa found that only 36.7 
percent of farmers surveyed held the land contracts and land use rights stipulated by the 
law.
44
  
Land reforms in Vietnam took a different trajectory.
45
 Vietnamese farmers are now 
allotted individualized land titles, but as the case studies discussed in this book show, this 
reform has not appreciably improved their bargaining position compared to that of 
Chinese farmers. Rather than retaining the household responsibility system and land 
contracts, the Land Law 1988 established individual land use rights for agricultural land 
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in Vietnam. Responding to bottom-up pressure, the state has incrementally increased the 
rights attached to land. For example, the Land Law 1993 gave farmers rights to transfer 
and mortgage agricultural land use rights, but limited land tenure to 20 years, leaving 
farmers with little residual value to trade. In practise, farmers have few opportunities to 
mobilize their land use rights against the state in land-taking cases—effectively nullifying 
their legal advantage over Chinese farmers. 
Neo-liberal property rights 
International pressure from foreign governments, international donor agencies, and 
foreign investors has also shaped internal debates about land reform in China and 
Vietnam. Reprising colonial enthusiasm for property rights, international donors such as 
the World Bank have been especially vocal in advocating transparent and robust private 
property rights. Donors were influenced by Harold Demsetz’s46 assertion that private 
property is the solution for resource tragedies. According to Demsetz, the privatization of 
property off-sets negative social costs, such as exclusion from natural resources, because 
the individual pursuit of self-interest increases overall social welfare. This classical 
economic notion that societies are better-off when people can reap what they sow dates 
back to the classical economics of Adam Smith. The World Bank has added the neo-
liberal economic objective of minimizing government oversight and maximizing Coasian 
bargaining between private property holders.47 
                                                 
46
 See Harold Demsetz, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights” (1967) 57 American Economic Review 347. 
47
 See Ronald Coarse, “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 Journal Law and Economics 1–44. 
19 
 
More recently, New Institutional Economic (NIE) theorists added weight to Demsetz’s 
claim by arguing that legally protected property rights are essential for economic 
development.
48
 Douglass North
49
 famously claimed: 
the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is 
the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary 
underdevelopment in the Third World.  
By the early 1990s, international donors seized on NIE theory to stress the importance of 
institutions—especially stable property rights—in promoting an orderly transition from 
socialism in China and Vietnam. 
Hernando de Soto,
50
 a leading exponent of this view, invoked the metaphor of a bell jar to 
explain the difference between registered and unregistered property rights. Those within 
the bell jar enjoyed state protection of their registered property rights, while he opined 
that those outside the bell jar must fend for themselves. The assumption underlying this 
metaphor is that state regulators and courts protect property rights more effectively than 
community-based, self-regulatory systems. Supporters of de Soto urged developing 
countries to upgrade their land regulation systems by replacing customary informality 
with land management technology.
51
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Other theorists are less certain than de Soto that “with each new year, the link between 
economic prosperity and property rights protection becomes increasingly clearer.”52 They 
criticize de Soto for drawing too sharp a distinction between state-backed property rights 
and self-regulation.
53
 In their estimation, it is questionable whether systems based on 
inalienable property rights provide the most effective mechanism where there is 
ambiguity about access to land and the resolution of disputes.
54
 Property rights, they 
maintain, do little to change disparities in wealth and power that animate many land 
contests. 
Adding to the mounting criticism, still other scholars
55
 argue that donors underestimated 
the regulatory role of informal institutions, such as family and business networks, in 
maintaining and stabilizing domestic regulatory systems. They point to the high-growth 
periods in North East Asia, especially in China and Vietnam, where formal property 
rights played a marginal role in economic development.
56
 Donald Clarke argues that “it is 
impossible to make the case that formal legal institutions have contributed in an 
important way to China’s remarkable economic success.”57 If anything, economic success 
has fostered the development of law, rather than the reverse. Rapid economic 
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development continues to thrive today despite ongoing shortcomings in the statutory 
protection of private property.
58
  
Fuzzy property rights 
China and Vietnam listened to advice from international donors and then proceeded to 
develop their own unique land rights systems. For specifics, refer to Chapters 3 and 11 in 
this book. Party leaders in both China and Vietnam refused to countenance a return to 
private land ownership, and instead created land use rights that, in some circumstances, 
convey tenure rights, such as unlimited duration, transfer, and mortgage rights that 
resemble full ownership. A movement away from the socialist notion that land is a 
“special commodity” toward individual land rights has advanced incrementally in both 
countries. This transition reflects intense internal debates about the continued role of the 
state in managing the economy and land. As Frank Upham argues forcefully in Chapter 2, 
in the long-term, economic growth depends on the possibility of shifting property rights 
to those who have the ability to put resources to more effective use. 
Despite more than two decades of legislative reforms, the terms ambiguity and 
“fuzziness” are often used to describe property rights in China and Vietnam, or for that 
matter, any legal right. Katherine Verdery
59
 coined the term “fuzzy” to describe the forms 
of property rights found in post-socialist Europe. The transition out of socialism, Verdery 
observed, did not entirely transform the institutional structures and epistemic settings that 
supported socialism. On the contrary, the transformation changed some structures but left 
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others relatively intact. In consequence, the property rights that emerged contained a 
complex mixture of private rights and collective obligations that differed from one 
context to another—leading Verdery to describe them as “fuzzy property rights.”  
Verdery’s observations are not limited to Europe, or in fact to a transformation out of 
socialism. The authors in this book narrate many examples where the transformation of 
socialism in China and Vietnam has generated fragmented institutional and epistemic 
structures that have generated fuzzy property rights. As we will see in the next section—
about China—fuzzy property rights are not only found where village land practises 
suppressed under socialism percolate up to the surface following decollectivisation. The 
state itself creates fuzzy property rights by treating state-owned or controlled enterprises 
differently from other sectors. 
Authors in this book have also observed state officials using fuzzy property rights in 
land-taking and compensation cases. Especially in China, the vague land use rights issued 
to farmers following decollectivization have aggravated land grabs by officials.
60
 Fuzzy 
property rights provide political and legal justification for predatory land-grabbing and 
serve as effective tools to silence farmers who have lost their land. Fuzzy property rights 
also give courts considerable discretionary powers in deciding private land claims against 
citizens and the state. As John Gillespie observed in relation to housing disputes in 
Hanoi:  
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Judges quickly exhaust the possibilities of statutory land rights and legal doctrines 
and either push cases back to state officials or use ‘reason and sentiment in 
applying the law’… a type of situational justice, to resolves cases.61  
Authors also reveal a close connection between politically sensitive cases and party 
intervention (see Chapters 4, 5, 9, and 11). Although the details differ from case to case, 
in general it falls to party organizations at provincial and central levels to resolve highly 
sensitive land-taking cases. Under the direction of the party, courts creatively interpret or 
entirely disregard property rights to secure predetermined outcomes.
62
 In these cases, 
every aspect of property rights is fuzzy. 
In other circumstances, fuzzy property rights are the source of considerable creativity 
where judges, officials, and mediators use conceptual ambiguity to find flexible solutions 
to land disputes that are not otherwise available in law. For example, in Chapters 6, 8, 
and 9, the use of grand mediation in China is discussed, which brings the party, state 
officials, and disputants together to explore extra-legal methods of dispute resolution. 
Chapter 11 shows how provincial party leaders in Vietnam take advantage of fuzzy 
property rights to circumvent ineffective legal procedures and negotiate directly with land 
claimants.  
The chapters on Taiwan and Hong Kong provide a useful counter-narrative to Socialist 
Asia. Colonial powers brought property rights and a judicial system capable of enforcing 
them to these countries. For example, Japanese colonizers introduced a land-titling 
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system to Taiwan, which, subject to various modifications, provides the basis for a rights-
based land system today (see Chapter 12). In Hong Kong, the British imported English 
land laws, courts, and judges. And as Chapters 15 and 16 show, more than a decade after 
decolonization, litigation provides a viable means of resolving most types of property 
disputes.  
What these countries clearly demonstrate is that capitalism and democracy, or at least, 
liberal political values, play a major role in protecting property rights in society. Yet, 
even in highly developed legal systems, property rights become fuzzy when they collide 
with customary land claims. 
Community conceptualizations of land disputes 
So far we have focused on state-based conceptualizations of land disputes. What makes 
this book distinctive is its multi-actor focus; it not only considers state regulation, but 
also decenters the analysis
63
 by considering what other actors think about land disputes. 
Decentered analysis provides a valuable corrective to state mythologizing that only 
central authorities possess regulatory solutions to land disputes. It also sheds light on the 
remarkable resilience of community land regulation, which continues to flourish despite 
unprecedented economic development and globalization in East Asia. The importance of 
community governance to ethnic minorities is well known;
64 
what is less well 
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documented and understood is the vital role it plays in urban, peri-urban, and rural 
centers in East Asia, and elsewhere.
65   
Far from being a fringe phenomenon, studies show that, in some developing countries, 
more than 80 percent of the population lives under community land systems.
66 
For 
example, an International Finance Corporation survey puts the level of land transactions 
taking place outside the state land tenure system in Hanoi at over 75 percent.
67 
Similarly 
high levels of unofficial land use are reported in rural and urban areas in China.
68 
Chapters 13, 15, and 16 show customary land systems flourishing in highly developed 
Asian cities, such as Hong Kong and Taipei. In fact, community land systems play a 
significant role in regulating land and housing disputes in most cases discussed in this 
book.   
Some authors in this book partially attribute the resilience of community governance to 
personal choice—in some circumstances, people prefer community governance to state 
regulation. In other cases, it is explained by necessity; where there is limited penetration 
of or poorly performing state institutions, people turn to community systems to determine 
what they can and cannot do with their land. Other authors ascribe the resilience of 
community systems not only to preference or necessity, but also more importantly to the 
interdependence between state and community systems (see Chapters 11 and 13). They 
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argue that differences between these regimes are often overstated, and that informality 
and formality describe regulatory styles or technologies, rather than binary cleavages 
between separate modes of governance. This argument connects with the previous 
discussion about fuzzy property rights occurring where different regulatory systems 
overlap. 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define what is meant by the term 
“community governance.” Recent scholarly analysis of communities has focused on 
geographically proximate groups that share some common connection other than physical 
proximity.
69 
Community in this sense involves an element of belonging and intra-
community empathy, mutual commitment to shared values and norms, and collaboration 
in the pursuit of common goals.
70
 As Robertson observed, “being embedded in a 
background context of beliefs, practices, goals, etc. is what makes perception of anything 
possible, and is also what gives that perception its ‘shape.’”71 Community governance is 
inter-subjective, in the sense that shared understandings about the optimal way to regulate 
land are generated largely within epistemologically compatible social or organizational 
groups. 
Taking this concept further, others argue that community governance is possible in 
groups that lack any physical proximity.
72
 Members of these virtual communities may 
knowingly or even unknowingly share common epistemological frameworks that orient 
them toward common understandings about access to land and dispute resolution. Virtual 
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communities not only encompass actors who share common interests in land, but also 
might include members of the public who are united through the mass media and 
especially social media.  
Rather than identifying communities by their degree of mutuality, theorists believe it 
makes more sense to mark out boundaries between communities.
73
 Factors that 
differentiate communities include different validity claims, sets of epistemologies and 
tacit understandings, as well as different levels of attachment and identification with the 
community. What this suggests is that land communities are distinguishable according to 
their cohesiveness and epistemic understandings of land regulation.  
In sum, land communities differ in the way in which they embed property relationships in 
wider sets of social, political, and economic relationships. “Embeddedness” is used here 
as a metaphor to indicate the relative extent to which property relates to legal, social, and 
economic domains. Different degrees and kinds of embeddedness are illustrated in the 
four land communities discussed below.  
One: Traditional land communities 
Traditional communities are comprised of close-knit groups that organize around 
consolidating ideologies, religions, or village traditions and employ comprehensive 
internal norms to validate their community.
74
 They are sometimes functionally or 
physically insulated from society, although some members of these communities might 
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engage with the outside world.
75 
The recent origin or hybrid nature of regulatory 
traditions does not diminish their potency. As Benedict Anderson reminds us, “invented 
traditions and ‘imaged communities’ are just as authentic to villagers as traditions with an 
‘objective’ historical provenance.”76 Communal land tenure, where communities or 
villages have well-defined, exclusive rights to jointly own and/or manage land, is a 
feature of some, but certainly not all, traditional communities. In China and Vietnam, 
communal land tenure is mostly widely practiced in remote areas, especially in the 
mountainous zones settled by ethnic minorities.
77
 Nevertheless, some authors (Chapters 
8, 9, and 11) show that traditional communities also flourish in highly developed rural 
and even urban locales. 
Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann
78
 observed that traditional communities 
typically “treat property relations as only one aspect or strand of more encompassing 
categorical relationships, in which kinship relations, property relations and relations of 
political authority are largely fused in a many-stranded or multiplex relationship.” In 
other words, property relations remain embedded in relational and/or spiritual practises 
and have not yet re-embedded in legal relationships. Traditional communities remain a 
common form of social organization in rural China and Vietnam, and the community 
structure continues to shape the way in which land disputes are resolved and the degree to 
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which state law may be involve in dispute resolution (see Chapters 7 and 11). Consider 
the Đông Dương villagers, discussed in Chapter 11, who invoked moral and spiritual 
claims to land that conflicted with the exclusive property rights recognized by the 
Vietnamese Land Law 2003. 
Revolution and modernization have exposed many villagers to the outside world, 
resulting in spontaneous urbanizing with or without state support and guidance. Authors 
show how people create their own urban transformation by replacing agriculture with 
small businesses and rental accommodation, for example. Through this transformation, 
property relationships are changing to accommodate new conditions but remain 
embedded in personalistic village connections.  
Two: Spontaneous land communities 
Spontaneous land communities arise when residents who live in the same area, or citizens 
connected through the mass and/or personal media, come together to oppose land 
developments (see Chapters 5, 7, and 11).
79
 Spontaneous communities differ from 
traditional communities in that they lack strong organizational structures and coherent 
sets of regulatory traditions that are capable of galvanizing collective resistance. As the 
case studies in this book show, spontaneous land communities organize collective action 
around agents of change. These entities play a crucial role in coordinating collective 
action, filtering and constituting ideas, and keeping people connected.  
Although most spontaneous land communities discussed by the authors (see Chapters 8, 
9, and 11) were physically connected to a geographical location, the growing use of 
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blogs, social media, and Weibo in particular, is creating virtual communities. Bloggers 
are often more prepared than the official media to test the boundaries of party-state 
narratives. The Osin blog in Vietnam, for example, linked the resolution of land disputes 
to party legitimacy, thus holding Vietnam’s leaders accountable for socio-economic 
problems. In China, Weibo has developed a virtual polity in which claims were made, 
judgments were made, and punishment was delivered, all by citizens independent of state 
power in the real world.     
What is different about spontaneous land communities is the multiple embeddedness of 
property relations. Since members of these communities cannot invoke village customs or 
practises to legitimize their claims, they are less likely than traditional communities to 
embed property in relational or spiritual connections. Instead they attempt to link 
property rights to a wide range of political, economic, and legal relationships. For 
example, spontaneous communities discussed in this book drew on socialist revolutionary 
arguments to legitimize their “rightful resistance” to land claims by capitalist investors 
(see Chapters 5, 7, and 11). They also embedded property in economic relationships 
based on employment and the commodity value of land. In China, spontaneous land 
communities used the courts as platforms to advance their claims (see Chapters 3, 4, and 
8). In Taiwan (see Chapter 12) and Hong Kong (see Chapter 14), spontaneous land 
communities framed their complaints in the language of property rights and successfully 
prosecuted their claims through the courts and public protests.   
Three: Planned land communities  
Planned land communities are created by land developers to resolve collective action 
problems that crop up for residents living in close proximity in high-rise apartments or 
31 
 
gated communities. Under Chinese Property Law, home-owners in gated communities 
are required to create home-owners associations (HOA) to manage common property 
within the community on behalf all home-owners. HOAs have become one of the most 
active groups protesting about property and in challenging arbitrary corporate and 
government powers. They promote democratic decision-making within gated 
communities and social networking between HOAs.
80
 
In contrast to the other land communities, residents living in planned communities are 
brought together by a formal set of legal conditions incorporated into governing 
documents.
81
 As a consequence, their property claims are primarily, although not 
exclusively, embedded in legal relationships. As the discussion in Chapter 11 shows, 
members of planned communities also draw on political connections to advance their 
claims. 
Four: State land communities 
State agencies, judges, and associated land professionals, such as lawyers, are not 
generally considered members of a community; nevertheless, like other land 
communities, they embed property in particular sets of relationships. As previously 
discussed, in adopting modernist approaches to land management, states throughout East 
Asia have disembedded property from relational connections. They have passed laws that 
categorize property holders, property objects, rights, duties, and rules for the 
appropriation and transfer of property rights. Legal property rights are meant to trump 
political, economic, and personalisitc relationships. But, as the authors make clear, 
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especially in China and Vietnam, law-based property rights and planning processes are 
interwoven with political and personalistic relationships—creating “fuzzy property 
rights.” The intervention of party politics as well as collusion and corruption suggests 
that, in practise, as distinct from legal theory, property rights have yet to disembed from 
political and relational connections. This gap between the assertion of legal autonomy 
made by the state and practise on the ground undermines the legitimacy of state land 
communities in the eyes of farmers and other land users.  
A key difference between Taiwan and Hong Kong, on the one hand, and China and 
Vietnam on the other hand, is the extent to which state land communities have detached 
property rights from political, economic, and personal relations. This relative autonomy 
translates into court protection of property rights and the civil space for land protests in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong.  
Intersecting land communities 
Land disputes are often characterized as clashes between modernity and tradition; 
however, the multi-embeddedness of property rights discussed above suggests 
shortcomings with this view. Most land communities discussed in this book drew from 
modernity and tradition to legitimize their property rights. Disputes revolved around 
differences in the emphasis communities placed on legal, political, social, and economic 
aspects of property relationships. Different emphasizes resulted in different 
understandings about what constituted socially just and fair dispute resolution processes 
and outcomes.  
In most disputes in China and Vietnam, no single land community, including the state, 
was sufficiently powerful to displace rival understandings about land disputes. In this 
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polycentric regulatory environment, lasting settlements are most likely to occur where 
land users and state agencies negotiate together in relatively unmediated dialogues to find 
common ground. In Taiwan and Hong Kong, the state land community has largely, but 
not entirely, displaced rival modes of property regulation. Courts, as a corollary, play a 
major role in resolving land disputes.  
The social dimensions of land disputes 
As Frank Upham points out in Chapter 2, rapid economic development in China, 
Vietnam, and elsewhere creates winners as well as losers. Since land is a scarce and 
highly valuable commodity, land expropriation and the resulting demolition and 
relocation create tangled webs of financial, social, and psychological harm. Losers in 
East Asia and elsewhere do not go quietly, and their grievances are a major source of 
conflict that involves individual and community stakeholders.  
In China and Vietnam, where land must be converted and expropriated for economic 
development purposes, land-taking is highly contentious, not just because it affects the 
economic interest of individuals and communities. Upham notes that, “land not only has 
economic value; it also constitutes the basis for social relations through the creation of 
individual, group, and community identities.” Land disputes are also contentious because 
they shape political, social, and legal institutions and the political economy. 
Land expropriation is a core component of the economic growth policy in China and 
Vietnam, and the party-state, authoritarian at its core, proves to be highly efficient in 
achieving its developmental agenda. In China, land appropriation takes place at great 
speed and through simple procedures. Unsurprisingly, this authoritarian efficiency 
generates disputes and conflict on a massive scale. The party-state, while aware of the 
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complications, has been trying to submerge land disputes in mediation for ad hoc 
resolution to achieve short-term social harmony. Mediation may preempt social 
contention in the short-term, but it does not resolve underlying conflicts, and in the long-
term, the process may generate more conflict than the original dispute. According to 
Upham, mediation may be damaging in two unique ways. First, mediation encourages 
“expressive violence” among the weaker parties, or “mob culture” of a sort, to counter 
the powerful developers and the government. Secondly, mediation creates a parallel 
system that is independent of, and competes with, formal judicial institutions and 
procedures. In the long-term, it undermines the legitimacy of law and the political 
system. Land expropriation creates tremendous social trauma that may not be avoidable 
in economic transition, but a better-designed dispute resolution system that is transparent, 
participatory, and responsive may reduce the harm and produce long-term stability.    
Country case studies  
This book is divided into four sections that deal with case studies in China, Vietnam, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Each country section begins with a chapter introducing the 
history of land regulation and its connection to contemporary land disputes. The 
introduction is then followed by chapters providing detailed cases studies about land 
disputes.  
China narrative 
In Chapter 3, Chen Lei traces the evolution of China’s land tenure system in both rural 
and urban areas. His chapter sets a historical and institutional context in which the current 
land law and policy operate. After identifying the defining characteristics of China’s land 
tenure system and pointing out the major problems that generate land disputes, the 
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chapter offers a concise discussion of the recent overhaul of the legal and regulatory 
framework for land dispute resolution, with a special focus on contentious expropriation 
of land and the resulting issue of fair compensation. Chen concludes that Chinese law and 
legal institutions are offering enhanced protection of property rights and creating more 
meaningful substantive and procedural limits on state powers.  
In Chapter 4, Cheng Jie puts the legal system to the test by offering a focused study of 
land-taking cases adjudicated in Chinese courts. Through a meticulous examination of 
200 court cases that apply the Land Management Law, Cheng presents powerful evidence 
to illustrate the limited role of courts. Cases reveal that courts struggle to balance state 
interest in expropriation and individual entitlement to land and to provide meaningful 
protection for the evictees’ land entitlements. Although the courts are more neutral and 
offer better protection of land rights in civil disputes between two equal private parties, 
the courts defer to government authorities in adjudicating the authorities’ disputes with 
private parties. Because of their constitutional and political status, courts can only play a 
limited role in contentious land disputes, tipping the scale decisively toward the interests 
of the collective and the state. Cheng concludes that, without achieving the necessary 
level of judicial independence and other institutional change, the capacity of the courts in 
offering effective land dispute resolution in China is highly constrained.  
In Chapter 5, Eva Pils goes beyond the positive law and formal legal framework for land 
disputes. She explores the contrasting conceptions of land rights in the context of land 
expropriation. For Pils, the expropriators, including developers, and the government 
standing behind them, and evictees, including their supporters and sympathizers, form 
two radically different perspectives on land rights. From a statist perspective, 
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expropriation of land is essential for China’s continuous economic growth, and given 
public ownership of land in the socialist system, is legally and morally justifiable. But, 
from the perspective of evictees and their representatives, expropriation, as it has been 
practiced in China, is predatory, corrupt, and in any event fundamentally unfair. The 
current property regime and the politics of expropriation have generated inevitable and 
often irreconcilable disputes that are bound to recur.  
In Chapter 6, Hualing Fu uses the famous Wukan protest against the predatory land-
taking as a case study to illustrate the potential of successful political mobilization in 
protecting property rights. The Wukan protest highlights a commonly observed irony in 
China that the government encourages citizens to settle their disputes through law, but at 
the same time creates multiple barriers to block citizens’ access to justice for meaningful 
legal remedies. In the end, frustrated citizens whose land is taken without proper 
compensation abandon the law and take the matter into their own hands. In the process, 
the citizens realize that, if they speak unequivocally and act collectively and firmly, their 
collective action increases the likelihood for the government to take its own law more 
seriously. Thus, there emerges the alternative of a mobilization-based trajectory in which 
people organize themselves and act forcefully on specific social and economic issues. 
Organized protest creates better opportunities for dialogue between protesters and the 
government and for reaching a mutually beneficial result of channeling contentious land 
disputes back to legal institutions for effective resolution. 
In Chapter 7, He Xin provides a more positive interpretation on the potential of courts to 
offer effective protection of property rights in housing demolition cases. Ordinarily, land 
disputes are characterized by power disparity between the parties. The disputes take place 
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largely between private citizens as plaintiffs and powerful developers and the government 
behind them as defendants, and as such, courts are not able to act fairly and effectively to 
correct the regulatory capture. However, the balance tips toward the plaintiffs when the 
plaintiffs act collectively and forcefully in and outside the courts to generate enough 
political pressure so that judges are forced to rule according to law. Public protest within 
the framework of law, as He frames it, can enhance transparency, accountability, and 
judicial independence, and as He concludes, the court can be used as an effective public 
forum for social and legal development.   
The two subsequent chapters offer empirical evidence to illustrate the limits of state law 
in resolving land disputes in rural areas. In Chapter 8 Courts and Political Stability: 
Mediating Rural Land Disputes, Hau Shao and Susan Whiting explore the enhanced role 
of mediation in solving rural disputes and the impact of the extensive use of mediation on 
the legal system in general and on the courts in particular. Through sample surveys and 
in-depth interviews, the authors examine the degree to which mediation undermines the 
ability of the courts to provide predictable and determinant legal norms to guide dispute 
resolution and inadvertently emboldens villagers to use violence. Farmers prefer formal 
rules and courts to solve high-stakes disputes, but political constraints prevent the courts 
from developing the capacity to offer effective remedies. These authors conclude that the 
unchecked and unprincipled use of mediation undermines the function of the legal system 
and creates popular dissatisfaction.  
In Chapter 9, Changdong Zhang and Christopher Heurlin explore the reasons why courts 
are timid in handling disputes through extensive field work on rural land disputes. The 
authors point out that local government officials prevent disputes reaching courts to hide 
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corrupt practises from their superiors. For example, officials push land disputes through 
mediation and use their administrative authority to block access to courts. The paradox is 
that imposed mediation may block farmers’ access to courts but cannot close off access to 
justice. Frustrated with the process and end result, farmers contest mediation and take 
their cases to the streets. Mediation as it is practiced in rural China provokes farmers and 
generates the very problem it tries to resolve.  
Vietnam narrative 
In Chapter 10, Toan Le and Nguyen Hung Quang show how cycles of adoption and 
reception have shaped land laws in Vietnam. First, the Chinese, and then the French, left 
their laws. Revolutionary land management practises borrowed from Maoist China and 
the former Soviet Union replaced, but did not entirely displace, the previous land 
regimes. More recently, Vietnam embarked on another cycle of borrowing, this time 
attempting to create private land use rights that commodified land. The authors argue that 
the rapid increase in land disputes in Vietnam has arisen not only from increased pressure 
on farmland, but also from a clash in the epistemic understandings between state officials 
and developers, on the one hand, and farmers, on the other hand, about who should have 
access to land and on what conditions.   
In Chapter 11, John Gillespie draws on a series of cases studies to examine why land 
disputes have proliferated in Vietnam at the same time as the state is perfecting property 
rights and formal dispute resolution agencies. He examines three disputes that reflect the 
previously discussed traditional, spontaneous, and planned land communities. In each 
case study, he shows that the state legal regime has not displaced pre-existing self-
regulatory practises. For example, state land use rights did not recognize or extinguish 
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farmers’ spiritual and moral claims to land circulating in the traditional Đông Dương 
village. The findings from the case studies point to a plurality of land regulation,
82
 where 
the state is only one of many regulators seeking to control access to land. In each case 
study, the state lacked the power to unilaterally impose its solutions on the land users and 
needed to cooperate with the other land communities to find mutually acceptable 
outcomes. As in China, however, land users had few opportunities to press their case 
through either formal state forums or via public discourse. It was only by staging civil 
disobedience campaigns that they leverage a position on the negotiating table.  
Taiwan narrative 
In Chapter 12, Po-Fang Tsai and Duan Lin show that the Taiwanese land regime is 
constructed  from different legal systems—the new overlying and interweaving with the 
old. Imperial Qing Dynasty land laws that aimed to pacify the local population were 
replaced by Japanese colonial laws during the late nineteenth century. Like the French 
colonial laws in Vietnam and the English colonial laws in Hong Kong, the Japanese laws 
were modeled on Western land title rules that abolished the link in Imperial Chinese law 
between group status and land rights. The colonial laws also centralized land control, a 
process that facilitated the creation of a new landlord class. Finally, the land laws 
separated administrative and judicial functions. For the first time, land disputants were 
given the option of taking their grievances to the courts for resolution. Unlike the 
Vietnamese, the Taiwanese did not abrogate their colonial legal system. After decades of 
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gradual consolidation and reform, the court system is now sufficiently independent from 
the executive arm of government to effectively adjudicate land-taking cases.  
In Chapter 13, Po-Fang Tsai and Duan Lin go on to show how formal state apparatus, 
such as administrative mechanisms and the courts, deal with disputes over land used for 
ancestor worship. When the Chinese Nationalist Government recovered Taiwan in 1945 
and started to apply modern Chinese civil law to Taiwan, ancestor worship land lost its 
legal status and was treated as common property. This change in legal status disrupted the 
personal relationships underlying this traditional practise and generated numerous land 
disputes. In an attempt to rectify this problem, the government introduced the Ancestral 
Worship Property Ordinance 2007, which once again recognized the legal status of 
ancestral worship property. But, as Po-Fang Tsai and Duan Lin narrate, the Ordinance 
has not resolved disputes because it does not adequately reflect the fluid and contextual 
relationships that govern this type of property. What the authors demonstrate is that, 
although formal state institutions can regulate most land disputes, they lack the flexibility 
to deal with nuanced relational property interests, such as ancestral worship property, 
which do not neatly fit within the narrow parameters of property law. 
Hong Kong narrative 
In Chapter 14, Say Goo explores how the English land law system took root and 
flourished in Hong Kong. He describes an entire system transfer. The English colonists 
not only brought land laws, but also the entire institutional trappings, including judges, 
lawyers, educational system, and even the judicial architecture, of the English legal 
system. Over time, the law spread beyond the colonial elites and came to govern most 
land transactions. But the English law did not entirely displace pre-existing regulatory 
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practises. It did not apply to the villages and farmland of the New Territories and co-
existed in an uneasy relationship with a thriving unofficial housing market.  
In Chapter 15, Say Goo takes up this story about the plural land systems in Hong Kong. 
To avoid disputes with land users in the New Territories, the colonial administration 
allowed the construction of new houses for male children during the nineteenth century. 
This initiative, which was formalized as the small house policy in 1972, recognized 
customary land practises that predated colonization. But, with the large population 
growth in the New Territory coupled with rapidly increasing land values, the policy 
currently threatens the integrity of land-planning schemes. What the study shows is that 
land law provides no effective solutions to complex resource disputes arising from land 
scarcity. Ultimately, the residents of the New Territories relied on the powerful Heung 
Yee Kuk association to voice their concerns through public discourse and political 
processes.  
Contrasting with the uncertainty surrounding the small house policy, courts routinely deal 
with disputes over Tso and Tong ancestral worship land. Here, the common law courts 
have shown their capacity to work customary practises into the formal legal rules 
governing the ownership and management of this kind of property.  
In Chapter 16, the connection between land disputes and political discourse reappears as 
Alice Lee discusses the regulation of unauthorized buildings and structures in Hong 
Kong. For decades, authorities in Hong Kong turned a blind eye to unauthorized 
buildings constructed on rooftops and other available spaces in the city. Faced with a 
rapidly increasing population and prohibitively expensive housing prices, authorities 
tacitly accepted unauthorized buildings as a means of housing the urban poor. This 
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relaxed regulatory approach changed following revelations of building violations during 
the 2011 elections. Intense media scrutiny of the candidates, itself a product of increasing 
democratization, spilled over into an official rethinking about the regulation of 
unauthorized buildings.  
This link between democratization and land disputes is also evident in the discussion 
about the Mei Foo Sun Chuen estate. In this case, neighbors complained that a 20-story 
housing development was being constructed on land set aside as a buffer-zone between 
existing apartment towers. Members of protest organizations staged a “lie-down” protest 
to prevent construction and to mobilize media support to campaign against the project. 
Mass civil disobedience provided an effective mode of communication when protestors 
lacked legal forums for expressing their views.  
It is instructive to contrast the Taiwanese and Hong Kong cases with the Chinese and 
Vietnamese cases. Taiwanese and Hong Kong courts routinely resolve land disputes that 
clearly fall within the parameters covered by the land law. But, where disputes escalate 
beyond simple legal questions about the validity of ownership or control and involve 
issues such as the small house policy or complex planning issues about environmental 
amenity, then disputants need to organize and mobilize to influence public policy. Recent 
democratization in Taiwan and Hong Kong has relaxed controls over the formation of 
protest organizations and the use of civil protest, leveling the playing field against state-
backed developers in ways that the legal protection of property rights cannot achieve.  
Conclusions 
In rapidly urbanizing and developing societies, such as China and Vietnam, land 
pressures and ongoing disputes are inevitable. Land-taking creates ongoing and contested 
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relationships between state agencies, developers, and land users. Without clear legal 
authority, unequivocal juridical foundations or irrefutable land compensation strategies, 
agreements will break down and be reshaped through fresh conflicts until a new 
consensus is reached. Dispute resolution is therefore highly dynamic, and land disputes 
are rarely settled once and for all. 
The case studies reveal the complexity of land disputes and the importance of decentering 
the analysis to consider what all of the relevant actors think. We have also seen that 
conflicts are socially constructed. Even when there is agreement about compensation, for 
example, disputes may continue if actors form different views about what constitutes fair 
and reasonable access to land. The findings further show how emotion transforms 
disputes and puts solutions based on pragmatic dialog out of reach. The case studies show 
that governments in China and Vietnam infrequently take steps to reduce the emotional 
intensity of disputes before outbreaks of civil disobedience and violence. For example, 
grand mediation in China, which is the main government response to proliferating land 
disputes, has proved relatively ineffective in reducing the scale and intensity of conflicts. 
When land-taking is perceived as a mere conspiracy between the power and money, there 
is little trust for local state institutions, legal or otherwise. Especially in an age when 
social media rapidly spreads information about land disputes, land users form clear views 
about the justice and appropriateness of land-taking and compensation and are difficult to 
manipulate through state-managed mediation and litigation.  
Suppression may produce short-term results in land-grabbing, but it is likely to backload 
social tension and conflict to a future date. Behind China’s authoritarian efficiency is a 
hidden social havoc that is surfacing slowly but resiliently. A more consultative and 
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accommodative approach that is inclusive of the voices of all stakeholders in decision-
making and goes through proper procedures reduces tension and violent conflict and 
produces more peaceful expropriation and resettlement. Procedural justice matters for 
East Asians as much as it matters for Westerners. 
Land disputes are often polycentric involving multiple parties fighting for the same 
interest and multiple institutions jointly offering solutions. As such, they are ill-suited for 
traditional court-centered litigation, and judicial reasoning does not offer the best options 
for land dispute resolution. This is especially true in countries like China and Vietnam 
where the courts are weak and cannot act effectively and independently on highly 
politicized issues such as land-taking. Dependence breeds corruption, and corruption 
undermines trust. In addition, legal rules and procedures in China and Vietnam are too 
“fuzzy” to provide sufficient guidance for dispute resolution. As is often the case in 
China and Vietnam, the courts eagerly push land-taking cases away for political 
resolution.  
Lasting settlements are most likely to occur where land users and state agencies negotiate 
together in relatively unmediated exchanges. This dialogue may occur where informal 
connections link the social organizations representing land users with party and 
government agencies. Without these linkages, social organizations often lack effective 
ways of making local party-state agencies accountable to land users. Low-level political 
participation in policy implementation is possible in China’s and Vietnam’s authoritarian 
system, but institutional channels for resolving land disputes are rigidly restricted. Tight 
state management of formal dispute resolution has the unintended consequence of driving 
land users into non-institutional channels. Frustrated land users organize themselves to 
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demonstrate their dissatisfaction, and with the support of the wider community, as well as 
public and social media, they sometimes force the government to compromise. 
There are signs of a more “responsible and responsive” state emerging in China and 
Vietnam. The Wukan reforms point to a renewed interest in grass-roots democracy as a 
means of opening dialogue that might resolve disputes intractable to mediation and court 
actions. Settlement is most likely to occur where land users have the power to deliberate 
with state officials on a relatively equal footing. For this to happen, land users need to 
organize and mobilize their resources, which, together with domestic and international 
support, may force the state and developers to the negotiation table. Political mobilization 
at the grass-roots level may, over time, force the state to take its own laws and procedures 
seriously in handling land disputes. 
Finally, it is unrealistic to rely entirely on dispute resolution to mitigate land disputes. 
Fiscal measures, such as removing the benefits of land sales and taxation, can reduce the 
incentives for local government to take land and pay low compensation. Urbanization 
may be inevitable, and land disputes are bound to increase, but responsive fiscal policies, 
effective anti-corruption enforcement, and enhanced social welfare might alleviate the 
growing pains that economic transition may inflict on developing nations and their 
people.   
 
 
